This paper studies the problem of optimally allocating a cash injection into a financial system in distress. Given a one-period borrower-lender network in which all debts are due at the same time and have the same seniority, we address the problem of allocating a fixed amount of cash among the nodes to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. Assuming all the loan amounts and asset values are fixed and that there are no bankruptcy costs, we show that this problem is equivalent to a linear program. We develop a duality-based distributed algorithm to solve it which is useful for applications where it is desirable to avoid centralized data gathering and computation. Since some applications require forecasting and planning for a wide variety of different contingencies, we also consider the problem of minimizing the expectation of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities under the assumption that the net external asset holdings of all institutions are stochastic. We show that this problem is a two-stage stochastic linear program. To solve it, we develop two algorithms based on Monte Carlo sampling: Benders decomposition algorithm and projected stochastic gradient descent. We show that if the defaulting nodes never pay anything, the deterministic optimal cash injection allocation problem is an NP-hard mixed-integer linear program. However, modern optimization software enables the computation of very accurate solutions to this problem on a personal computer in a few seconds for network sizes comparable with the size of the US banking system. In addition, we address the problem of allocating the cash injection amount so as to minimize the number of nodes in default. For this problem, we develop a heuristic algorithm which uses reweighted ℓ1 minimization. We illustrate this algorithm using three synthetic network structures for which the optimal solution can be calculated exactly. We show through numerical simulations that the solutions calculated by our algorithm are close to optimal.
Introduction
The events of the last several years revealed an acute need for tools to systematically model, analyze, monitor, and control large financial networks. Motivated by this need, we propose to address the problem of optimizing the amount and structure of liquidity assistance in a distressed financial network, under a variety of modeling assumptions and implementation scenarios.
Two broad applications motivate our work: day-to-day monitoring of financial systems and decision making during an imminent crisis. Examples of the latter include the decision in September 1998 by a group of financial institutions to rescue Long-Term Capital Management, and the decisions by the Treasury and Problem I-stochastic: Allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance among the nodes in a financial network in order to minimize the expectation of the (possibly weighted) sum of unpaid liabilities in the system. We prove in Section 5 that, under the payment scheme assumed in [20] -whereby each defaulting bank uses all its available funds to pay all its creditors in proportion to the amounts it owes them-this problem is equivalent to a stochastic linear program. To solve this problem we develop two algorithms based on Monte Carlo sampling: a Benders decomposition algorithm described in Section 5.1 and a projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm described in Section 5.2. Both algorithms are centralized (non-distributed) and assume that we are able to efficiently obtain independent samples of the external asset vector.
We show in Section 4 that under the all-or-nothing payment scheme where the defaulting nodes do not pay at all, Problem I is an NP-hard mixed-integer linear program. However, we show through simulations that use optimization package CVX [33, 32] that this problem can be accurately solved in a few seconds on a personal computer for a network size comparable to the size of the US banking network.
We also consider another problem where the objective is to minimize the number of defaulting nodes rather than the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities:
Problem II: Allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance among the nodes in a financial network in order to minimize the number of nodes in default.
For Problem II, we develop a heuristic algorithm using a reweighted ℓ 1 minimization approach inspired by [12] . We illustrate our algorithm using examples with synthetic data for which the optimal solution can be calculated exactly, and show through numerical simulations that the solutions calculated by our algorithm are close to optimal. We also illustrate this algorithm using random networks for which the optimal solution is not available, and show that our algorithm performs significantly better than a simple greedy method.
While Problem II is unlikely to be of direct practical importance (indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a regulator would consider the failures of a small local bank and Citi to be equally bad), it serves as a stepping stone to a more practical and more difficult scenario where the optimization objective is a linear combination of the weighted unpaid liabilities (as in Problem I) and the sum of weights over the defaulted nodes (an extension of Problem II).
Problem III: Given a fixed amount of cash to be injected into the system, we consider an objective function which is a linear combination of the sum of weights over the defaulted nodes and the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities.
We show that this problem is equivalent to a mixed-integer linear program.
Related Literature
Contagion in financial networks has been frequently studied in the past, especially after the financial crisis in [2007] [2008] . Notable examples of network topology analysis based on real data are [10, 51, 16, 37] . Real data informs the new approaches for assessing systemic financial stability of banking systems developed in [27, 22, 23, 52, 34, 17, 47, 13, 45, 28, 4, 35, 26, 3] .
Often, systemic failures are caused by an epidemic of defaults whereby a group of nodes unable to meet their obligations trigger the insolvency of their lenders, leading to the defaults of lenders' lenders, etc, until this spread of defaults infects a large part of the system. For this reason, many studies have been devoted to discovering network structures conducive to default contagion [1, 15, 44, 29, 2, 9, 5] . The relationships between the probability of a systemic failure and the average connectivity in the network are investigated in [29, 5, 1] . Other features, such as as the distribution of degrees and the structure of the subgraphs of contagious links, are examined in [2] .
While potentially useful in policymaking, most of these references do not provide specific policy recipes. One strand of literature on quantitative models for optimizing policy decisions has focused on analyzing the efficacy of bailouts and understanding the behavior of firms in response to bailouts. To this end, gametheoretic models are proposed in [46] and [7] that have two agents: the government and a single private sector entity. The focus of another set of research efforts has been on the setting of capital and liquidity requirements [15, 36, 30] in order to reduce systemic risk.
Our work contributes to the literature by taking a network-level view of optimal policies and proposing optimal cash injection strategies for networks in distress. Our present paper extends our earlier work reported in [40, 41, 39] . In addition to ours, several other papers have recently considered cash injection policies for lending networks [18, 19, 48, 49, 14] , all based on the framework proposed in [20] .
A cash injection targeting policy is developed in [18, 19] for an infinitesimally small amount of injected cash. The basic idea of the policy is to inject the cash into the node with the largest threat index, which is defined as the derivative of the unpaid liability with respect to the current asset value. However, extending this idea to construct an optimal cash injection policy for non-infinitesimal cash amounts produces an inefficient algorithm, as we show in Section 3.2. We show that our own method proposed in Section 3.1 is both more efficient and more flexible, as it can be extended to a more complex stochastic model described in Section 5.
In [48, 49] , bankruptcy costs are incorporated into the model of [20] . The main contribution of that work is showing that because of the bankruptcy costs, it is sometimes beneficial for some solvent banks to form bailout consortia and rescue failing banks. However, it may happen that the solvent banks do not have enough means to effect a bailout, and in this case external intervention may still be needed.
A multi-period stochastic clearing framework based on [20] is proposed in [14] , where a lender of last resort monitors the network and may provide liquidity assistance loans to failing nodes. The paper proposes several strategies that the lender of last resort might follow in making its decisions. One of these strategies, the so-called max-liquidity policy, aims to solve our Problem I during each period. However, [14] does not describe an algorithm for solving this problem.
Another related work is [31] . Based on the clearing payment framework in [20] , the authors of [31] study the probability of contagion and amplification of losses due to network effects when the system suffers a random shock.
Outline of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of financial networks, the clearing payment mechanism, and the notation. Section 3 shows that if each defaulting node pays its creditors in proportion to the owed amounts, then Problem I and its Lagrangian formulation are equivalent to linear programs. A reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm to solve Problem II is also developed in Section 3. Section 4 considers Problem I under the assumption that the defaulting nodes do not pay anything. We prove that it is then an NP-hard problem and can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program that can be efficiently solved using modern optimization software for network sizes comparable to the size of the US banking system. Section 5 extends Problem I to the situation where the capital of each institution is random. Section 6 proposes a duality-based distributed algorithm to solve Problem I and its Lagrangian formulation.
Model and Notation
Our network model is a directed graph with N nodes where a directed edge from node i to node j with weight L ij > 0 signifies that i owes $L ij to j. This is a one-period model with no dynamics-i.e., we assume that all the loans are due on the same date and all the payments occur on that date. We use the following notation:
• any inequality whose both sides are vectors is component-wise;
• 0, 1, e, c,p, p, w, s, and d are all vectors in R N defined in Table 1 ;
is the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities in the system;
• N d is the number of nodes in default, i.e., the number of nodes i whose payments are below their liabilities, p i <p i ;
• Π ij is what node i owes to node j, as a fraction of the total amount owed by node i, • Π and L are the matrices whose entries are Π ij and L ij , respectively.
Given the above financial system, we consider the proportional payment mechanism and the all-or-nothing payment mechanism. The latter can be alternatively interpreted as the proportional payment mechanism with 100% bankruptcy costs. As proposed in [20] , the proportional payment mechanism without bankruptcy costs is defined as follows. Proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs:
• If i's total funds are at least as large as its liabilities, then all i's creditors get paid in full.
• If i's total funds are smaller than its liabilities, then i pays all its funds to its creditors.
• All i's debts have the same seniority. This means that, if i's liabilities exceed its total funds then each creditor gets paid in proportion to what it is owed. This guarantees that the amount actually received by node j from node i is always Π ij p i . Therefore, the total amount received by any node i from all its borrowers is
Under these assumptions, a node will pay all the available funds proportionally to its creditors, up to the amount of its liabilities. The payment vector can lie anywhere in the rectangle [0,p] . Under the all-ornothing payment scenario, the defaulting nodes do not pay at all. All-or-nothing payment mechanism:
• If i's total funds are at least as large as its liabilities (i.e.,
N j=1
Π ji p j + e i ≥p i ) then all i's creditors get paid in full.
• If i's total funds are smaller than its liabilities, then i pays nothing.
As defined in [20] , a clearing payment vector p is a vector of borrower-to-lender payments that is consistent with the conditions of the payment mechanism. Several algorithms for computing the clearing payment vector are discussed and compared in Appendix A.
In this paper, we are mostly concerned with Problems I and II under the proportional payment scenario with no bankruptcy costs. We also prove that the all-or-nothing payment scenario makes Problem I NP-hard. In this case, Problem I can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program that can be efficiently solved on a personal computer using modern optimization software for network sizes comparable to the size of the US banking system.
3 Centralized Algorithms for Problems I, II, III under the Proportional Payment Mechanism
Minimizing the Weighted Sum of Unpaid Liabilities is an LP
Consider a network with a known structure of liabilities L and a known vector e of net assets before cash injection. Using the notation established in the preceding section, Problem I seeks a cash injection allocation vector c ≥ 0 to minimize the following weighted sum of unpaid liabilities,
subject to the constraint that the total amount of cash injection does not exceed some given number C:
In this section, we assume proportional payments with no bankruptcy costs. We first prove that, for any cash injection vector c, there exists a unique clearing payment vector that maximizes the cost W .
Lemma 1. Given a financial system (Π,p, e), a cash injection vector c and a weight vector w > 0, there exists a unique clearing payment vector p minimizing the weighted sum W = w T (p − p).
Proof. Method 1 : First, note that since w andp do not depend on p or c, minimizing W is equivalent to maximizing w T p. With a fixed cash injection vector c, the financial system is equivalent to (Π,p, e + c).
Since w > 0, we have that w T p is a strictly increasing function of p. By Lemma 4 in [20] , the clearing payment vector p can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
subject to
From Theorem 1 in [20] , there exists a greatest clearing payment vector p * . Since W is a strictly increasing function of p, p * is a solution of LP (1-3). For any other p = p * , we have p i ≤ p and p 2 , and define p + ∈ R N as p
Here the inequality is strict because
For each i, by definition, p This completes the proof of Lemma 1. We now establish the equivalence of Problem I and a linear programming problem.
Theorem 1.
Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the asset vector e, the weight vector w, and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and known. Assume that the system utilizes the proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs. Consider Problem I, i.e., the problem of calculating a cash injection allocation c ≥ 0 to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities W = w T (p − p) subject to the budget constraint 1 T c ≤ C. A solution to this problem can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
Proof. Since the constraints on c and p in LP (4-6) form a closed and bounded set in R 2N , a solution exists.
Moreover, for any fixed c, it follows from our Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 in [20] that the linear program has a unique solution for p which is the clearing payment vector for the system. Let (p * , c * ) be a solution to (4) (5) (6) . Suppose that there exists a cash injection allocation that leads to a smaller cost W than does c * . In other words, suppose that there exists c
Note that c ′ satisfies the first two constraints of (4-6). Moreover, since p ′ is the corresponding clearing payment vector, the last two constraints are satisfied as well. The pair (p ′ , c ′ ) is thus in the constraint set of our linear program. Therefore, Eq. (7) contradicts the assumption that (p * , c * ) is a solution to (4) (5) (6) . This completes the proof that c * is the allocation of C that achieves the smallest possible cost W .
In the Lagrangian formulation of Problem I, we are given a weight λ and must choose the total cash injection amount C and its allocation c to minimize λC + W . This is equivalent to the following linear program: max C,c,p
This equivalence follows from Theorem 1: denoting a solution to (8) by (C * , p * , c * ), we see that the pair (p * , c * ) must be a solution to (4-6) for C = C * . At the same time, the fact that C * maximizes the objective function in (8) means that it minimizes λC + W = λC + w T (p − p), sincep is a fixed constant.
Comparison with Demange's Algorithm
A cash injection targeting policy is developed in [18, 19] for an infinitesimally small amount of the injected cash. The basic idea of Proposition 4 in [19] is to inject the cash into the node with the largest threat index, which is defined as the derivative of the sum of the unpaid liabilities with respect to the current asset value. Moreover, as small amounts of cash are gradually injected, the target remains the same until at least one bank is fully rescued (i.e., changes from defaulting to solvent), so the optimal policy for non-infinitesimal amounts of cash would be to keep injecting cash into the same node until one node changes its state. While no algorithm for the injection of a non-infinitesimal amount of cash (i.e., for our Problem I) is proposed in [18, 19] , we construct such an algorithm based on the ideas from [18, 19] . Algorithm for Problem I based on [18, 19] :
1. Initialization: set cash injection vector c ← 0 and the remaining cash still to be allocated C r ← C.
2.
Compute the clearing payment vector p for system (Π,p, e + c).
3. Compute the threat index for system (Π,p, e + c) by solving the linear program (13) in [19] . Select the one with the largest threat index, denoted as node i 0 .
4. Inject a small amount of cash δ into node i 0 and update the clearing payment vector p ′ . Define ∆p = p ′ − p as the increase of the payment vector after injecting δ into node i 0 .
Computep
i −pi ∆pi for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Select the smallest one, denoted as node i 1 . Then node i 1 will be the first node that changes from defaulting to being solvent when we keep injecting cash into node i 0 .
Each iteration of this algorithm computes the clearing payment vector twice: in Steps 2 and 4.
Step 3 moreover involves solving a linear program to obtain the threat index. In the worst case, the algorithm will stop after N iterations since at each iteration, only one defaulting node is guaranteed to be rescued. Thus, we would need to solve N LPs and compute the clearing payment vector 2N times in the worst case-much less computationally efficient than our approach of Theorem 1 which requires solving a single LP. Note that the above algorithm makes a simplifying assumption in Step 4 that a small number δ can be found in advance such that the injection of δ in Step 4 does not lead to the rescue of any banks. Our
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Level s=S-1 (leaves) Figure 1 : Binary tree network.
algorithm based on Theorem 1 does not require this simplifying assumption. In addition, unlike our LP method, the above algorithm has limited applications. For example, it is not easy to extend this algorithm to solve Problem I-stochastic.
Minimizing the Number of Defaults
Given that the total amount of cash injection is C, Problem II seeks to find a cash injection allocation vector c to minimize the number of defaults N d , i.e., the number of nonzero entries in the vectorp − p.
We adapt the reweighted ℓ 1 minimization strategy approach from Section 2.2 of [12] . Our algorithm solves a sequence of weighted versions of the linear program (4-6), with the weights designed to encourage sparsity ofp − p. In the following pseudocode of our algorithm, w (m) is the weight vector during the m-th iteration.
1. m ← 0.
2. Select w 0 (e.g., w 0 ← 1).
3. Solve linear program (4-6) with objective function replaced by p T w (m) .
Update the weights: for each
where ǫ > 0 is constant, and p * (m) is the clearing payment vector obtained in Step 3.
5. If w (m+1) − w (m) 1 < δ, where δ > 0 is a constant, stop; else, increment m and go to Step 3.
Note that nodes for whichp
is very small require very little additional resources to avoid default. This is why Step 4 is designed to give more weight to such nodes, thereby encouraging larger cash injections into them. On the other hand, nodes for whichp i − p * (m) i
is very large require a lot of cash to become solvent. The algorithm essentially "gives up" on such nodes by assigning them small weights. We test the algorithm on three networks for which we know the optimal solution.
Example: A Binary Tree Network
First, we use a full binary tree with S levels and N = 2 S − 1 nodes. As shown in Fig. 1 , levels 0 and S − 1 correspond to the root and the leaves, respectively. Every node at level s < S − 1 owes $2 S−s to each of its two creditors (children). We set e = 0. 
can be achieved by allocating the entire amount to the root node. For 8 ≤ C < 2 S+1 , we first observe that if C = 2 S+1−s for some integer s, then the optimal solution is to allocate the entire amount to a node at level s. This would prevent the defaults of this node and all its 2 S−s−1 − 2 non-leaf descendants, leading to 2
can represent it as a sum of powers of two and apply the same argument recursively, to yield the following optimal number of defaults:
where T (x) = 2 x−1 − 1 is the number of non-leaf nodes in an x-level complete binary tree, b(u) is the u-th bit in the binary representation of C (right to left) and U is the number of bits. To summarize, the smallest number of defaults N d , as a function of the cash injection amount C, is:
In our test, we set S = 10. The green line in Fig. 2 is a plot of the minimum number of defaults as a function of C from Eq. (9) . The blue line is the solution calculated by our reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ = 0.001. The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five random ones and w (0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults was selected. As evident from Fig. 2 , the results are very close to the optimal for the entire range of C.
Example: A Network with Cycles
Second, we test our algorithm on a network with cycles shown in Fig. 3 . The network contains M cycles with six nodes each. The nodes in the k-th cycle are denoted n k1 , n k2 , · · · , n k6 . Node n k1 owes $2a to n k2 . Node n k6 owes $a to n k1 . For i = 2, · · · , 5, n ki owes $a to n k(i+1) . The root node, denoted as n R , owes $a to n k1 , for every k = 1, 2, · · · , M . We set e = 0. If C < a, then the root node and all M nodes connected to the root, n k1 (k = 1, 2, · · · , M ), are in default. The remaining 5M nodes are not in default. If C ≥ aM , then allocating the entire amount C to the root yields zero defaults. If a ≤ C < aM , then giving $a to node n k1 will prevent it from defaulting. Thus, the total number of defaults in this case is
Summarizing, for this network structure, the smallest number of defaults N d , as a function of the cash injection amount C, is:
In our test, we set a = 10 and M = 100. In Fig. 4 , the green line is a plot of the minimum number of defaults as a function of C. The blue line is the solution calculated by our reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ = 0.001. The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five random ones and w (0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults was selected. As evident from Fig. 4 , the results produced by our algorithm are very close to the optimal ones for the entire range of C. 
Example: A Core-Periphery Network
Third, we test our algorithm on a simple core-periphery network, since core-periphery models are widely used to model banking systems [21, 24, 37, 16] . In Fig. 5 , i, ii, and iii are the three core nodes. Node i owes $100 each to nodes ii and iii, and node ii owes $100 to iii. Ten periphery nodes are attached to each core node, and each periphery node owes $20 to its core node. There are no external assets in the system and therefore in the absence of an external injection of cash, all the nodes are in default except node iii.
If the cash injection amount is C < 100, the optimal solution is to select any [C/20] periphery nodes and give $20 to each of them. This reduces the number of defaults by [C/20] .
If 100 ≤ C < 200, we first select any five periphery nodes of core node ii and give $20 to each of them, because this saves both node ii and these five periphery nodes. If C ≥ 600, then all the nodes can be rescued by giving $20 to each periphery node. To sum up, for this core-periphery network structure, the smallest number of defaults N d , as a function of the cash injection amount C, is:
In Fig. 6 , the green line is a plot of this minimum number of defaults as a function of C. The blue line is the solution calculated by our reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ = 0.001. The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five random ones and w (0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults was selected. As evident from Fig. 6 , the results produced by our algorithm are very close to the optimal ones for the entire range of C.
Example: Comparison to a Greedy Algorithm on Random Networks
We now compare our algorithm to a simple greedy strategy using more complex network topologies in which the optimal solution is difficult to calculate directly. At each iteration of the greedy algorithm, we calculate the clearing payment vector and select the node with the smallest unpaid liability among all the defaulting nodes. We inject cash into that node to rescue it so that during each iteration, we save the one node that requires the smallest cash expenditure. The algorithm terminates when the injected cash reaches the total amount C. To compare our reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm and the greedy algorithm, we construct a random graph with 30 nodes. For any pair of nodes i and j, L ij is zero with probability 0.8 and is uniformly distributed between [0, 2] with probability 0.2. The external asset vector e is 0. We sample 100 networks from this distribution and run both the reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm and the greedy algorithm on each sample network. The results are shown in Fig. 7 . The blue and red lines represent the average numbers of defaulting nodes after the cash injection allocated by the two algorithms: blue for the reweighted ℓ 1 minimization and red for the greedy algorithm. The green dotted lines show the error bars for the estimates of the average. Each error bar is ±two standard errors. From Fig. 7 , we see our algorithm works significantly better than the greedy algorithm on these random networks.
Minimizing a Linear Combination of Weighted Unpaid Liabilities and Sum of Weights over Defaulting Nodes
We now investigate Problem III which is a combination of Problem I and Problem II. Instead of just minimizing the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities or the number of defaulting nodes, we consider an objective function which is a linear combination of the sum of weights over the defaulted nodes and the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities:
As defined in Table 1 , d i = Ip i −pi>0 is a binary variable indicating whether node i defaults, and s i is the weight of node i's default. Since D is strictly decreasing with respect to p, Lemma 4 in [20] implies that minimizing D will yield a clearing payment vector. In light of this fact, we prove that minimizing D subject to a fixed injected cash amount C is equivalent to a mixed-integer linear program.
Theorem 2. Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the external asset vector e, the weight vectors w > 0 and s > 0 and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and known. Assume that the system utilizes the proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs. Define d as in Table 1 . Then the optimal cash allocation policy to minimize the cost function D = w 
Proof. Let (p * , c * , d * ) be a solution of the mixed-integer linear program (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) . We first show that p * is a clearing payment vector, i.e., that for each i, we have p *
this is not the case for some node k, i.e., that p *
We construct a vector p ǫ which is equal to p * in all components except the k-th component. We set the k-th component of p ǫ to
Since Π is a matrix with non-negative entries, for any i = k, we have:
is also in the feasible region of (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) Second, we show that (17) and (18) . If (17) (13) and (14), and that the corresponding clearing payment
to:
Since p ′ is the corresponding clearing payment vector, constraint (15) and (16) 
All-or-Nothing Payment Mechanism
We now show that under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem I is NP-hard. Despite this fact, we show through simulations that for network sizes comparable to the size of the US banking system, this problem can be solved in a few seconds on a personal computer using modern optimization software.
Theorem 3.
With the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem I can be reduced to a knapsack problem, which means that Problem I is NP-hard.
Proof. Consider the network depicted in Fig. 8 . The network has N = 2M nodes where M is a positive integer. We let L i,M+i =p i for i = 1, 2, · · · , M ; for all other pairs (i, j), we set L ij = 0. We set the external asset vector to zero: e = 0. We set all the weights to 1: w = 1. We let x i be the rescue indicator variable for node i, i.e., x i = 0 if i is in default and
Note that under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, fully rescuing node i for any i = 1, · · · , M in Fig. 8 means injecting c i =p i . On the other hand, injecting any other nonzero amount c i <p i is wasteful, as it does not reduce the total amount of unpaid liabilities in the system. Therefore, for each defaulting node i we have x i = 0, c i = 0, and p i = 0, and for each rescued node i we have x i = 1, c i =p i , and p i =p i . The reduction in the total amount of unpaid obligations due to the cash injection is
We must select x to maximize this amount, subject to the budget constraint
x ipi ≤ C that says that the total amount of cash injection spent on fully rescued nodes must not exceed C:
x ipi ≤ C,
If any cash remains, it can be arbitrarily allocated among the remaining nodes or not spent at all, because partially rescuing a node does not lead to any improvement of the objective function. Program (19) is a knapsack problem, a well-known NP-hard problem. Thus, Problem I under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism for the network of Fig. 8 , which can be reduced to (19) , is an NP-hard problem.
We now establish a mixed-integer linear program to solve Problem I with the all-or-nothing payment mechanism.
Theorem 4. Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the external asset vector e, the weight vector w > 0 and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and known. Assume the all-or-nothing payment mechanism. Then Problem I is equivalent to the following mixed-integer linear program:
Proof. Let (p * , c * , d * ) be a solution of the mixed-integer linear program (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) . We first show that p * is the clearing payment vector corresponding to c * . For node i,
Π ji p * j +e i +c i , then from constraints (24) and (25) 
Numerical Simulations
To solve MILP (20), we use CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex programs [33, 32] . A variety of prior literature, e.g. [51] , suggests that the US interbank network is well modeled as a core-periphery network that consists of a core of about 15 highly interconnected banks to which most other banks connect. Therefore, we test the running time on a core-periphery network shown in Fig. 9 . It contains 15 fully connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 periphery nodes. Each periphery node has a single link pointing to the corresponding core node. Every node has zero external assets: e = 0. All the obligation amounts L i,j are independent uniform random variables. For each pair of core nodes i and j the obligation amount L ij is uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. For a core node i and its periphery node k, the obligation amount L ki is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. For a core node i, we set the weight w i = 10; for a periphery node k, we set the weight w k = 1. For this core-periphery network, we generate 100 samples. We run the CVX code on a personal computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The average running time is 1.7598s and the sample standard deviation is 0.9751s. The relative gap between the objective of the solution and the optimal objective is less than 10 −4 . (This bound is obtained by calculating the optimal value of the objective for the corresponding linear program, which is an upper bound for the optimal objective value of the MILP.) We can see that for the core-periphery network, MILP (20) can be solved by CVX efficiently and accurately. The CVX code is given in Appendix B.
Random Capital Model
In the previous sections, we assume that the external asset vector e is a deterministic vector known by the regulator. However, some applications, such as stress testing, require forecasting and planning for a wide variety of different contingencies. Such applications call for the use of stochastic models for the nodes' asset amounts. In this case, we aim to solve a stochastic version of Problem I where e is modeled as a random vector. It is assumed that we are able to efficiently obtain independent samples of this vector. The remaining parameters-p, Π and w-are still assumed to be deterministic and known, and are defined as in the previous section. According to Lemma 1, the clearing payment vector that minimizes the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities is a function of e and c, which we denote as p * (e, c). If e is a random vector, so is p * (e, c). We use W * (e, c) to denote the corresponding minimum value of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. If e is a random vector, then W * (e, c) is a random variable. Given a total amount of cash C, our aim is to find the optimal cash allocation strategy c to minimize the expectation of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. This can be formulated as the following two-stage stochastic LP:
where
Even if the joint distribution of e is known, the distributions of p * (e, c) and W * (e, c) cannot be computed in closed form. In order to solve (26), we take M independent samples of the asset vector, denoted as 
Similar to Theorem 1, the optimization problems (27) and (28) can be combined into one single LP:
subject to Hence, efficient algorithms to solve LP (29) are needed.
Benders Decomposition
If the cash injection vector c is fixed, then the LP (29) can be split into M smaller independent LPs-one for each sample e m -each of which can be solved independently for each p m . In this case, instead of solving an LP with M N variables, we solve M LPs with N variables each, which significantly reduces the computational complexity. Inspired by this idea, we apply Benders decomposition to the LP (29). Benders decomposition, which is described in [6, 50, 38] , makes a partition of c and p m (m = 1, 2, · · · , M ) and allows us to find p m iteratively with fixed c in each step. In fact, for our problem, Benders decomposition can be further simplified due to some special properties of (29) . From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that for any fixed c, the feasible region of p m is non-empty. Thus, (29) is equivalent to the following problem:
We let µ 1 , · · · , µ M be the dual variables for the M constraints (32), and we let ν 1 , · · · , ν M be the dual variables for the M constraints (33) . Then V (c) can be obtained from the following dual problem:
Note that, since V (c) minimizes the objective function of LP (34) subject to the constraints of LP (34), we have that V (c) is the greatest lower bound of this objective function, subject to these constraints. Therefore, LP (30) is equivalently rewritten as the maximization of the lower bound to the objective function of LP (34), subject to the constraints of both LP (30) and LP (34):
for all (µ m , ν m ) in the feasible region of (34).
LP (35) , the equivalent version of (29) , has an infinite number of constraints in the form of (36), because constraint (36) must be satisfied by every pair (µ m , ν m ) from the feasible region of LP (34) . The key idea is solving a relaxed version of (35) by ignoring all but a few of the constraints (36) . Assume the optimal solution of this relaxed program is (c * , θ * ). If the solution satisfies all the ignored constraints, the optimal solution has been found; otherwise, we generate a new constraint by solving (34) with fixed c = c * and add it to the relaxed problem. Here is the summary of the Benders decomposition algorithm:
2. Fix c l , solve the following M sub-programs for m = 1, 2, · · · , M :
Denote the solution as (µ m * , ν m * ), for m = 1, 2, · · · , M .
If

M m=1
V m = θ l , terminate and c l is the optimal. 
Set
Denote the solution as (c * , θ * ). Set θ l ← θ * , c l ← c * . Then go to Step 2.
In this algorithm, at each iteration, we solve M + 1 LPs with N variables instead of one LP with M N + N variables, which saves both computational complexity and memory cost. Note that, comparing to the general form of Benders decomposition (Section 2.3 in [50] ), the above algorithm is simpler. Since LP (31) is always feasible and bounded, it is not necessary to consider constraint (22b) in [50] .
Step (2') in [50] can also be removed since (37) is always bounded.
Projected Stochastic Gradient Descent
In this section, we introduce the projected stochastic gradient descent method to solve (26) . This is an online algorithm, which allows us to handle one sample at a time, without building a huge linear program. The basic idea is that for each sample e m , we move the solution c along the direction of the negative gradient of W * (e m , c) with respect to c and then project the result onto the set defined by the constraints of (26) .
This procedure will converge to the optimal solution if the step size is selected properly [11] . The algorithm proceeds as follows. At iteration m, 
3. Set c m as the projection ofc m onto the set {c :
According to [11] , step size γ m should satisfy the condition that 
subject to 0 ≤ p ≤p,
To obtain the gradient of W * (e m , c m−1 ) in Step 2, we consider the dual problem of LP (39):
Assuming that (µ * , ν * ) is a solution of (40), we have ∇ c W * (e m , c m−1 ) = −∇ c U (e m , c m−1 ) = −ν * .
In
Step 3, we find the projection ofc m using the following quadratic program:
Thus, at each iteration in this projected stochastic gradient descent method, instead of solving LP (29) which contains M N + N variables, we solve one N -variable LP and one N -variable quadratic program. This algorithm is memory efficient because it requires no storage except the current solution of c.
Distributed Algorithms for Problem I with Proportional Payment Mechanism
We showed in Theorem 1 that Problem I without bankruptcy costs is equivalent to a linear program, and therefore can be solved exactly, for any network topology, using standard LP solvers. In some scenarios, however, this approach may be impractical or undesirable, as it requires the solver to know the entire network structure, namely, the net external assets of every institution, as well as the amounts owed by each institution to each other institution. We now adapt our framework to applications where it is necessary to avoid centralized data gathering and computation. We propose a distributed algorithm to solve our linear program. The algorithm is iterative and is based on message passing between each node and its neighbors. During each iteration of the algorithm, each node only needs to receive a small amount of data from its neighbors, perform simple calculations, and transmit a small amount of data to its neighbors. During the message passing, no node will reveal to any other node any proprietary information on its asset values, the amounts owed to other nodes, or the amounts owed by other nodes. Our algorithm can be used both to monitor financial networks and to simulate stress-testing scenarios. The integrity of the process can be enforced by the supervisory authorities through auditing.
While the algorithm is slower than standard centralized LP solvers, simulations suggest its practicality for the US banking system which we model as a core-periphery network with 15 core nodes and 1050 periphery nodes.
Problem I
A Distributed Algorithm
To develop a distributed algorithm for LP (4-6), we formulate its dual problem and solve it via gradient descent because the dual problem has simpler constraints which are easily decomposable. It turns out that every iteration of the gradient descent involves only local computations, which enables a distributed implementation.
In order to apply the gradient descent method to the dual problem, we need the objective function in (4) to be strictly concave, which would guarantee that the dual problem is differentiable at any point [25] . However, the objective function of LP (4) is not strictly concave and so we apply the Proximal Optimization Algorithm [43, 8] . The basic idea is to add quadratic terms to the objective function. The quadratic terms will converge to zero so that we make the objective function strictly concave without changing the optimal solution.
We introduce two N × 1 vectors y and z and add two quadratic terms
to (4). Then we proceed as follows. Algorithm P: At the t-th iteration,
• P1) Fix y = y(t) and z = z(t) and maximize the objective function with respect to p and c:
Note that since the objective function is strictly concave, a unique solution exists. Denote it as p * and c * .
• P2) Set y(t + 1) = p * , z(t + 1) = c * .
It is proved in Proposition 4.1 in [8] that algorithm P will converge to the optimal solution of LP (4-6).
Implementation of Algorithm P
In
Step P1, for fixed y and z, the objective function of (41) is strictly concave so that the dual problem is differentiable at any point [25] . Hence, we can solve the dual problem using gradient descent, as follows. Let a scalar λ and an N × 1 vector q be Lagrange multipliers for constraints (42) and (43), respectively. We define the Lagrangian as follows:
where λ and q are non-negative and I N ×N is an N × N identity matrix. We further expand (44):
To obtain Eq. (46) from Eq. (45), we use the following equation:
the objective function of the dual problem is:
In Eq. (46), the term q j Π ij is 0 if node i is not a borrower of j. Thus, if node i receives all the q j from its lenders, it can determine p i and c i to achieve the maximum of the Lagrangian L(p, c, λ, q, y, z).
Given y and z, the dual problem of (41) is then minimizing (47) over Lagrange multipliers λ and q:
The dual problem is differentiable at any point since the objective function of the primal is strictly concave [25] . Hence, gradient descent iterations can be applied to solve the dual.
At iteration u, λ = λ(u) and q = q(u). Then the gradients of D with respect to λ and q at this point are:
where p(u) and c(u) solve (47) for λ = λ(u) and q = q(u):
, and
Therefore, taking into account the non-negativity of λ and q, the gradient descent equations are: Figure 10 : Duality-based approach.
where α and β are the step sizes, and [x] + = max{0, x}. For fixed y and z, the dual update will converge to the minimizer of D as u → ∞, if the step size is small enough [8] .
From (51), we notice that in order to update λ, c i is required from all the N nodes. It means at each iteration t, each node should send c i (u) to a central node so that the central node could update λ and send it back to every node in the system. If node j is not a borrower of node i, then Π ji p j (u) = 0; otherwise, Π ji p j (u) represents the amount of money that node j pays to node i at u-th iteration. Hence, with the information of Π ji p j (u) from all its borrowers, node i is able to update q i based on (52).
A More Efficient Algorithm
As shown in Fig. 10 , in the algorithm, we first fix y and z and solve (41) by updating λ, q and p, c iteratively until they converge. Then we update y and z. This is a two-stage iteration, which is likely to slow down the convergence of the entire algorithm as too many dual updates are wasted for each fixed y and z [43] . To avoid the two-stage iteration structure, we consider the following algorithm. Algorithm A: At the t-th iteration,
• A1) Fix y = y(t) and z = z(t), maximize L with respect to p and c,
L(p, c, λ(t), q(t), y(t), z(t)). Figure 11 : The t-th iteration of the distributed algorithm A for a fixed maximum total amount of injected cash.
• A2) Update Lagrange multipliers λ(t + 1) and q(t + 1) by
• A3) Update y and z with
L(p, c, λ(t + 1), q(t + 1), y(t), z(t)).
In algorithm A, instead of an infinite number of dual updates, we only update Lagrange multipliers λ and q once for each fixed y and z. The following theorem guarantees the convergence of algorithm A.
Theorem 5. Algorithm A will converge to the optimal solution of LP (4-6) provided the step sizes α and β are sufficiently small.
Theorem 5 is an extension of Proposition 4 in [42].
Implementation of Algorithm A
Assume B i and C i are the sets of borrowers and creditors of node i respectively. Then the t-th iteration of algorithm A is as follows.
1. For each node i, fix y i = y i (t), z i = z i (t), λ = λ(t) and q = q(t), and calculate p i and c i :
Then send Π ij p i (t) to every node j ∈ C i , and send the updated c i (t) to node N c .
2. Each node i receives Π ki p k (t) from every k ∈ B i and updates q i :
Then each node i sends the updated q i (t + 1) to every node k ∈ B i .
Node N c receives c i from all nodes i and updates λ:
Then node N c send the updated λ(t + 1) to every node i.
3. Every node i receives q j (t + 1) from each j ∈ C i and receives λ(t + 1) from node N c , then updates y i and z i : These steps are illustrated in Fig. 11 .
In Step 3, δ 1 and δ 2 are the stopping tolerances, which are usually set as small positive numbers according to the accuracy requirement. We utilizeỹ andz rather than their projections y and z in the stopping criterion because the convergence ofỹ andz implies the convergence of the Lagrange multipliers q and λ, whereas the convergence of y and z does not.
In the implementation of algorithm A, we include a central node. At each iteration the central node has two functions. One is to sum the c i (t) and calculate λ(t + 1) in Step 2; the other is to test whether b i = 1 for all nodes i in Step 3. For both functions, the central node only collects a small amount of data and performs simple calculations. We could entirely exclude the central node by calculating the sum of c i (t) and communicating the stopping sign in a distributed way, at the cost of added computational burden during each iteration. 
Lagrange Formulation of Problem I
We now apply the duality-based distributed algorithm to LP (8), the Lagrange formulation of Problem I. Note that now λ represents the importance of the injected cash amount in the overall cost function. The algorithm is similar to Section 6.1 except for the fact that λ is not updated at each iteration because λ is fixed and given. Similar to (44), we define the Lagrangian as:
The objective function of dual problem is:
L(p, c, q, y, z)
Then the dual problem is: min
The Lagrange multipliers q are updated by (54), where p and c maximize Lagrangian (55).
Implementation of Algorithm A ′
Our algorithm for this problem is a simple modification of Algorithm A. We call it Algorithm A ′ . Its t-th iteration is as follows.
1. Each node i fixes y i = y i (t), z i = z i (t), and q = q(t), and calculates p i and c i :
Then each node i sends Π ij p i (t) to every node j ∈ C i .
Then each node i sends the updated q i (t + 1) to every k ∈ B i .
3. Each node i receives q j (t + 1) from every j ∈ C i and updates y i and z i :
, and 
Numerical Results
Example 1: A Four-Node Network
In this section, we illustrate the convergence of our distributed algorithm to the optimal solution. We use a four-node network shown in Fig. 13(a) . Node A owes $50 to B and C, node B owes $20 to C, node C owes $80 to A, and node D owes $10 to C. Each node has $1 on hand. After all the clearing payments, the borrower-lender network reduces to Fig. 13(b) . Without any external financial support, nodes A, C, and D We first study Problem I, the case with a fixed maximum total amount of injected cash. We assume that we can inject at most $15 into the system. We run our algorithm with initial y(0) = z(0) = q(0) = 0 and λ = 0. The step size is α = β = 0.1, and the stopping tolerance is δ 1 = δ 2 = 10 We see from Fig. 16 that although A is still in default, in the optimal bailout strategy we choose not to inject any cash in A. The reason is that if we inject some cash $x into A in Fig. 16 , the total unpaid liability will decrease by $x so that the unpaid liability term of the cost function will be reduced by 0.45x, i.e., the value of the overall cost function will actually increase by x − 0.45x = 0.55x.
Example 2: A Core-Periphery Network
In this section, we examine the practicality of our distributed algorithm. As in Section 4, we assume that the US interbank network is well modeled as a core-periphery network that consists of a core of 15 highly interconnected banks to which most other banks connect [51] . We test the distributed algorithm for LP (8) on a simulated core-periphery network illustrated in Fig. 9 . The core network consists of 15 fully connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 corresponding periphery nodes which owe money only to this core node. For each pair of two core nodes i and j, we set L ij as a random number uniformly distributed in [0, 10] . For a core node i and its periphery node k, L ki is set to be uniformly distributed in [0, 1] . All these obligation amounts are statistically independent. The asset vector is e = 0. In addition, we assume w i = 0.3 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , and λ = 1 in LP (8) . We generate 100 independent samples of a core-periphery network drawn from this distribution. These samples thus all have the same topology but different amounts of liabilities. We run the distributed algorithm of Section 6.2.1 with initial conditions y(0) = z(0) = q(0) = 0. The step size is β = 0.01. The stopping criterion for the distributed algorithm is max{ ỹ(t+1)−ỹ(t) ∞ , z(t+1)−z(t) ∞ } < 10 −7 .
Let T d be the value of the total cost function W + λC calculated by our distributed algorithm, and let T l be the corresponding value obtained by solving the linear program directly, in a centralized fashion. Under this stopping criterion, the relative error, defined as |T d − T l |/T l , is less than 10 −6 for each sample in our simulations. The number of iterations is shown in Fig. 18 . The average number of iterations is 5.51 × 10 5 . Moreover, from Fig. 18 , we can see that for most cases, the algorithm terminates within 10 6 iterations.
The time spent on each iteration consists of two parts: the computing time and the time it takes to convey messages between the nodes. During each iteration, a node needs to transmit information to a set of neighbors twice: in Steps 1 and 2. Note that in Step 3, the stopping sign b i is transmitted to the central node. However, it is not necessary for a node to wait for the response before next iteration. Therefore, we do not count it towards the communication delay during one iteration. It takes light 13.2ms to travel from LA to NYC, which is the longest possible distance between two financial institutions within the continental US. So the propagation delay in one iteration could be roughly estimated as 13.2ms × 2 = 26.4ms. Hence, for most cases, the algorithm would terminate within 26.4ms × 10 6 = 7.3h, and the average running time would be below 26.4ms × 5.51 × 10 5 = 4.04h. These running times would be acceptable in applications where these computations are run overnight or during a weekend. Note that the computation time at each node is negligible compared to these communication times, and therefore we ignore it in these estimates. Another possible set-up is that each institution provides a client-end computer and we colocate these computers in one room. Assuming that the longest network cable in this room is 100 meters, the propagation delay per iteration would be around 2 × 100/(3 × 10 8 ) = 6.67 × 10 −7 s. For the computing time, we just analyze the core nodes because the periphery nodes have no borrowers and only one creditor so that the computing time for the periphery nodes is much smaller than for the core nodes. Usually, multiplications dominate the computing time. At each iteration, a core node calculates q j (t)Π ij , Π ij p i (t), and q j (t + 1)Π ij for all its creditors j. Since the core network is a fully connected network with 15 core nodes, a core node has 14 creditors so that it does less than 50 multiplications per iteration. Assuming that each multiplication takes 500 cpu cycles and the cpu on the client-end computer is 3GHz, then the computing time per iteration is around 50 × 500/(3 × 10 9 ) = 8.33 × 10 −6 s. Thus, for most cases, the algorithm terminates within institutions in the system, we can significantly reduce the running time of our distributed algorithm so that it can be easily run many times during a day. In a monitoring application, our aim might be to calculate the payments approximately rather than exactly. In this case, the running time can be reduced by relaxing the termination tolerance. We set the stopping criterion as max{ ỹ(t + 1) −ỹ(t) ∞ , z(t + 1) −z(t) ∞ } < 10 −3 . Under this stopping criterion, the relative error, |T d − T l |/T l , is less than 1% for each sample in our simulations. Fig. 19 ) × 10 4 ≈ 0.1s.
The above running time analysis is for the Lagrangian formulation of Problem I, in which λ is a constant. In Problem I, λ is a dual variable that also needs to converge. So the running time of the distributed algorithm for Problem I will be larger than the time for its Lagrangian formulation. From Fig. 15 and Fig. 17 , we observe that with the same stopping tolerance, the number of iterations of the distributed algorithm for Problem I is around 10 times the number of iterations for its Lagrangian formulation. Therefore, for Problem I, to calculate the exact payment vector, the algorithm will terminate within around 70h for the non-colocated scenario and within 100s for the colocated scenario. To obtain the payments within 1% error, the algorithm will terminate within around 44min and 1s for the non-colocated and colocated scenarios.
Conclusions
In this work, we have developed a linear program to obtain the optimal cash injection policy, minimizing the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities, in a one-period, non-dynamic financial system. Based on this linear program, we have further proposed a reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm to find the cash injection allocation strategy which minimizes the number of defaults in the system. By constructing three topologies in which the optimal solution can be calculated directly, we have tested the reweighted ℓ 1 minimization algorithm and shown through simulation that our results are close to optimal. Moreover, we have proposed a duality-based distributed algorithm to solve the linear program. The distributed algorithm is iterative and is based on message passing between each node and its neighbors. No centralized gathering of large amounts of data is required, and each participating institution avoids revealing its proprietary book information to other institutions. The convergence and the practicality of the distributed algorithm are both supported by our simulations. We have also considered the situation where the capital of institutions at maturity is a random vector with known distribution. We have developed a stochastic linear program to find the optimal cash injection policy to minimize the expectation of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. To solve it, we have proposed two algorithms based on Monte Carlo sampling: Benders decomposition algorithm and projected stochastic gradient descent. In addition, we show that the introduction of the all-or-nothing payment mechanism turns the optimal cash injection allocation problem into an NP-hard mixed-integer linear program. However, we show through simulations that use optimization package CVX [33, 32] that this problem can be accurately solved in a few seconds for a network size comparable to the size of the US banking network. In [20] , zero bankruptcy costs are assumed, and three methods of finding the clearing payment vector are proposed: a fixed-point algorithm, the fictitious default algorithm and an optimization method. In this section, we first introduce and analyze these three methods and then compare their computation times under different network topologies.
A.1.1 Fixed-Point Algorithm
By definition, the clearing payment vector is a fixed point of the following map:
where the minimum of the two vectors is component-wise. Under certain mild assumptions specified in [20] , the fixed point is unique. It can be found iteratively via the following algorithm [20] . Fixed-point algorithm:
1. Initialization: set p 0 ←p, k ← 0, and set the stopping tolerance δ 0 to a small positive number based on the accuracy requirement. At each iteration, the computational complexity is dominated by Π T p, which is Θ(N 2 ). The number of iterations is highly dependent on the network topology and the amounts of liabilities.
A.1.2 Fictitious Default Algorithm
The fictitious default algorithm is proposed in Section 3.1 in [20] . The basic idea is to first assume that all the nodes pay their liabilities in full. If, under this assumption, every node has enough funds to pay in full, then the algorithm terminates. If some nodes do not have enough funds to pay in full, it means that these nodes would default even if all the other nodes pay in full. Such defaults that are identified during the first iteration of the algorithm are called first-order defaults. In the second iteration, we assume that only the first-order defaults occur. Every non-defaulting node k pays in full, i.e., p k =p k ; every defaulting node i pays all its available funds, i.e.,
If there is no new defaulting nodes during this second iteration, then the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, the new defaulting nodes are called second-order defaults, and we proceed to the third iteration. In the third iteration we assume that both the first-order and second-order defaults occur. We calculate the new payment vector and again check the set of defaulting nodes. We keep iterating until no new defaults occur. Since there are N nodes in the system, this algorithm is guaranteed to terminate within N iterations. The specifics of the fictitious default algorithm are as follows. Fictitious default algorithm:
2. For all nodes i, compute the difference between their incoming payments and their obligations:
as the set of defaulting nodes:
by solving the following system of equations:
6. Set k ← k + 1 and go to Step 2.
At each iteration of the fictitious default algorithm, the computational complexity is dominated by solving the linear equations in Step 5. The number of unknowns in these equations and the number of equations are both equal to the number of elements in D (k) . In the worst case, the number of defaulting nodes in the system is of the same order as N . In this case the computational complexity per iteration is O(N 3 ) [53] .
Compared to the fixed-point algorithm, the fictitious default algorithm has a larger computational complexity per iteration, and, as shown below in Section A.1.4, larger running times on several network topologies. However, the advantage of the fictitious default algorithm is that it is guaranteed to terminate within N iterations. Moreover, the fictitious default algorithm will produce the exact value of clearing payment, unlike the fixed-point algorithm which produces an approximation.
A.1.3 Linear Programming Method
Define f (p) = 
The computational complexity of solving an LP is O(N 3 ) [53] .
A.1.4 Comparison of Running Times on Three Different Topologies
We calculate the clearing payment vector via the above three methods on three different network topologies and compare the running times. The first network topology is a fully connected network with 1000 nodes. All the obligation amounts L ij and asset amounts e i are independent random variables, uniformly distributed Fig. 9 . It contains 15 fully connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 periphery nodes. Each periphery node has a single link pointing to the corresponding core node. Every node has zero assets: e = 0. All the obligation amounts L i,j are independent uniform random variables. For each type of network, we generate 100 samples. The average running times and the sample standard deviations of the running times for the three methods are shown in Table 2 . For the fully connected network and for the linear network, the fixed-point algorithm is the most efficient one. For the core-periphery topology, the linear programming method is the most efficient one; however, its computation time is highly variable because simpler topologies result in Π being a sparse matrix, reducing the running time.
A.2 All-or-Nothing Payment Mechanism
A.2.1 Fixed-Point Algorithm and Fictitious Default Algorithm
We now assume the all-or-nothing payment mechanism where node i paysp i if it is solvent and pays nothing if it defaults. Therefore, the clearing payment vector is a fixed point of the map Ψ defined as follows:
otherwise
We find the fixed point of Ψ(·) iteratively via the following algorithm. Fixed-point algorithm:
1. Initialization: set p 0 ←p, k ← 0.
2. p k+1 ← Ψ(p k ).
3. If p k+1 = p k , stop and output the clearing payment vector p k+1 ; else, set k ← k + 1 and go to Step 2.
In fact, under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, this fixed-point algorithm can be interpreted as the following fictitious default algorithm. We initially assume that all the nodes pay their liabilities in full, i.e., p 0 =p. If, under this assumption, every node has enough funds to pay in full, then the algorithm terminates. If some nodes do not have enough funds to pay in full, it means that these nodes would default even if all the other nodes pay in full. We define these nodes as first-order defaults. With function Ψ(·), we identify the first-order defaults and set their payments to zero. In the second iteration, we assume that only the first-order defaults occur. Every non-defaulting node k pays in full, i.e., p k =p k ; every defaulting node i pays 0, i.e., p i = 0. Again, with function Ψ(·), we identify the new defaulting nodes, which are called second-order defaults, and set their payments to zero. If there are no such new defaulting nodes, the algorithm terminates; otherwise, we proceed to the third iteration. We keep iterating until no new defaults occur, i.e., p k+1 = p k .
Since there are N nodes in the system, this algorithm is guaranteed to terminate within N iterations. At each iteration, the computational complexity is dominated by Π T p, which is Θ(N 2 ). Therefore, the computational complexity of the fixed-point algorithm (fictitious default algorithm) is O(N 3 ).
A.2.2 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming Method
The clearing payment vector can also be obtained by solving MILP (20) We solve MILP (57) via CVX [33, 32] .
A.2.3 Comparison of Running Times on Three Different Topologies
We calculate the clearing payment vector under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism via the above two methods on three network topologies described in Section A.1.4, and compare the running times. Similar to Section A.1.4, we generate 100 samples. The average running times and the sample standard deviations of the running times for the two methods are shown in Table 3 . For all the three topologies, the fixed-point algorithm is significantly more efficient than the MILP method.
B CVX code for MILP (20) Below is the CVX code to solve MILP (20) . The parameters that appear in the code are defined in Table 4 . 
